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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY AND
LIMITATION
The plaintiff brought an action for declaratory judgment under
Ohio G.C. sec. 12102-1 et seq. to have a note cancelled and declared
void as usurious because no consideration was given. The defendant con-
tended that the bill could not be brought under the Uniform Declara-
tory Judgment Act because the plaintiff had another remedy. The
Supreme Court held that the remedy is alternative in any case in which
the court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, finds the relief sought
to be within the spirit of the act and where speedy relief is necessary to
the preservation of rights which might otherwise be impaired or lost.
Schaefer v. First National Bank of Findlay, 134 Ohio St. 5 11, 18 N.E.
(2d) 263 (1938).
This is the first time the problem of whether the relief under the
act is alternative has been before the Ohio Supreme Court. The problem
was unsettled in the lower courts. The view had been taken that the
act should be liberally construed. Kochs v. Kochs, 49 Ohio App. 327,
2 Ohio 0. 212 (935); R.K.O. Distributing Co. v. Realty Co., 3
Ohio 0. 524 (935); Walker v. Walker, 132 Ohio St. 137, 5 N.E.
(2d) 405 (1936). It was early held that the remedy is alternative,
Flowers v. Metcalf, 4 Ohio 0. 301 (I935), but the opposite view was
reached in Eiffel Realty Co. v. Citizens Trust Co., 55 Ohio App. i,
8 N.E. (2d) 470 (1937). There was a strong dissenting opinion in
this case and the case was severely criticized. Glosser, The Declaratory
Judgment as an Alternative Remedy in Ohio (1937) 4 O.S.L.J. i;
Note (1937-8) 5 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 143. Several courts since the
Eifel case have held that the remedy is alternative, and have discussed
this case but have not seen fit to follow it. Otten v. Cincinnati, io Ohio
0. 276 (937); Pearson v. Pearson, 58 Ohio App. 503, 16 N.E.
(2d) 837 (1938). In one case where the plaintiff had another remedy
the court allowed the declaratory judgment without discussing the
problem. Cromley v. Prudential Ins. Co., II Ohio 0. 49 (1936). It
has been previously held that the remedy is not alternative but dis-
cretionary with the court. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Savoy
Grill, Inc., 51 Ohio App. 504, 1 N.E. (2d) 946 (1936). In a recent
common pleas case the same facts as in the Schaefer case were present
and a declaratory judgment was given. Schroeder v. Lewis, 12 Ohio
0. 393 (1938).
There is much confusion and conflict in the decisions in other
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jurisdictions. Some courts have held the remedy is definitely alternative
in one line of cases, Tuscaloosa County v. Shamblin, 233 Ala. 6, 169
So. 234 (1936); Cohen v. Rosen, i57 Va. 71, i6o S.E. 36 (i93x);
Chick v. MacBain, 157 Va. 6o, i6o S.E. 214 (i93); Dept. of Treas.
of Ind. v. J. P. Michael Co., ii N.E. (2d) 512 (Indiana, 1937);
.dllison v. Sharp, 209 N.C. 477, 184 S.E. 27 (936), while in another
line of cases they have held that the remedy is exclusive and can only
be used when another adequate remedy is not available. Bagwell v.
W'oodward Iron Co., 184 So. 692 (Alabama, 1938); American Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Kirshner, 162 Va. 378, 174 S.E. 777 Q934);
Brindley v. Meara, 209 Ind. 144, 198 N.E. 301, ioi A.L.R. 682
(i935); Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 203 N.C. 767, 167 S.E.
38 (932). Several jurisdictions have rather clearly taken a stand that
the remedy is alternative. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Billstein, 283
N.W. 138 (Minnesota, 1939); Lisbon Village District v. Town of
Lisbon, 85 N.H. 173, 155 Ad. 252 (93I); Kaleikau v. Hall, 27
Haw. 420 (1923); Miller v. Siden, 259 Mich. 19, 242 N.W. 823
(1932). This is strikingly illustrated in Michigan where the Miller
case was criticized by Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment an Exclu-
sive or Alternative Remedy (932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. i8o, and the
court took an even narrower view point in Wolverine Mut. Mtr. Ins.
Co. v. Clark, 277 Mich. 633, 270 N.W. 167 (1936). A third group
of courts have taken the liberal view and have held consistently that the
remedy is alternative. Wollenberg v. Tonningsen, 8 Cal. App. (2d)
722, 48 Pac. (2d) 738; Hays Committee v. Hays Guardian, 260 Ky.
586, 86 S.W. (2d) 313 (935); Penn v. Glenn, io Fed. Supp. 483
(935). It is to be noted that since the Penn case the new Rules of
Procedure for Federal Courts have been adopted, and in Rule 57 this
problem has been taken care of so that as far as the Federal courts are
concerned the remedy is alternative.
Other authorities are as much in disagreement as are the courts.
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, (934), p. 147 et seq.;
16 Am. Jur., Declaratory Judgments, sec. 13; 1 Corpus Juris Secun-
dum, Actions, sec. I8 (8); I4 A.L.R. 1361 (1938), and earlier
annotations therein referred to; Note (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 536;
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in Pennsylvania (1934) 82 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 317; Note 0934) 44 Yale L.J. 694; Borchard, AnIndi-
ana Declaratory Judgment (935) I1 Ind. L.J. 376; Missouri Declar-
atory Judgment Act (937) 5 Kans. City L. Rev. 77.
Most of the states have reached a midway position on this question
either by the direct language of their decisions or as evidenced by a
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swinging from one view to the other. It would seem to this writer that
the weight of authority is in accord with the Schaefer case, i.e., that the
remedy is neither alternative nor exclusive, but that it rests in the sound
discretion of the court whether relief shall be given when there is another
less desirable remedy and so the relief asked for is within the spirit of
the act. This conclusion is arrived at by the fact that many jurisdictions
have swung from one side to the other without any apparent reason
except that in one case the remedy was more desirable than the coercive
remedy and in another case less desirable. The fact that courts have
taken a stand that the remedy is not alternative, and later given declara-
tory relief where another adequate remedy existed without any comment
on the point; the fact that courts have taken a definite stand that the
relief is alternative, and then when a close case came up justified their
refusal to give the declaratory relief on some technical grounds; the
very fact that the various writers have spent so much time trying'to
justify and distinguish these cases would tend to show that the courts
have taken the view set down in the Ohio case while trying to uphold
their former decisions.
The Ohio Supreme Court has laid a very flexible groundwork for
a very far reaching remedy. In the face of all the clamor for procedural
reform it is hoped that the bench and bar will use this remedy to cut
down time and expense. The legislature has refused to define, lest the
craft of man evade the definition. The bench should, in using this dis-
cretionary power, confine itself to the facts at hand and not lay down
unnecessary precedents which will be binding on later equally competent
courts. This decision and rule will further avoid the difficult problem
with which equity has to contend of deciding what "adequacy of the
other remedy" means and when it exists. ROBERT E. TEAFORD
EVIDENCE
EVIDENCE - IMPEACHMENT OF ONE'S OWN WITNESS
Defendant was charged with the crime of burglary. On trial the
State introduced a witness who, before being convicted of the same
crime, had made a sworn statement confessing his part in the affair and
naming defendant as an associate. On the stand the witness failed to
identify defendant as one of his accomplices. Surprised by this change
of face the prosecutor was permitted to question the witness with regard
to his previous sworn statement. In reversing the Court of Appeals
which had reversed the Common Pleas Court, the Supreme Court held:
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